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Summary 
Globalization is one of the most hotly debated and discussed topics of 
our time; it is the most influential force in the world today. Among the wider 
subject of globalization is a plethora of related and interconnected subjects and 
areas, which together are all part of the phenomena in question. The impression 
is that recent the developments of information, communications and 
technologies (ICT) have made the world a ‘smaller place’ to live in and thus 
more globalized. This could also be an exaggeration of the current volumes of 
globalization being experienced, the truth may be that greater affluence and 
divisions of labour are simultaneously facilitating divergence of cultures, the 
widespread use of the term ‘think global, act local’ could be a social and 
cultural symptom or indicator of the early stages of such a world wide trend. 
This paper, based on a number of selected references and additional reading, 
provides a critical account on the globalization and its predictability. 
Introduction 
Presently the term globalisation is used to describe a number of varied 
trends, which are thought to be occurring across the world. Disintegration of 
welfare states, dissolution of national borders and the decreasing ability of 
nation states to govern themselves with complete control over economic 
activities, are all cited as important characteristics of this phenomenon. Other 
factors often referred to include deregulation of national and international 
business, increasingly rapid, varied and voluminous growth and spread of 
communication, of international trade and especially growth of foreign direct 
and other international investment. Thus on, a descriptive level it is generally 
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associated with the breakdown of communication bottlenecks and a trans-
nationalisation of economic activities, such as trade, investment and production 
(Ryer, 2002). 
The term has become increasingly popular since the 1970s. It appears at 
times to be used to explain or describe almost anything and everything that is 
new in the contemporary modern economy. Often it appears to be used to help 
explain the trend towards greater integration of countries with outside and in 
regional trading blocs. For example ‘at the outset the EU was characterised 
both as a structure and a strategy. Globalisation was defined in terms of the 
volume of trans-territorial transactions since the mid-1970s and the systematic 
consequences thereof (Burke, 1996). 
Such fairly vague, usage can be seen in ways in which the mass media 
often regard, as apparently unprecedented, degrees of international economic 
integration and free trade as constituting a ‘global’ state of affairs. Some 
observers believe, however, that relatively high levels of such integration and 
international trading are not new, but merely another phase of ongoing cycles 
of economic and societal convergence and divergence that the world has been 
experiencing since Ancient times. In this paper, it is argued that globalisation is 
just merely one of the many cycles of convergence and divergence that have 
occurred throughout history. 
Evidence for Globalisation as Unprecedented 
The term globalisation has no common, widely agreed upon meaning; it 
is associated with the widening and deepening of international economic 
interactions (Milberg, 1998). Milberg (1998) suggested that while there was no 
commonly used and agreed definition of globalisation, what it represented was 
nonetheless very real, consisting mainly of interaction between and integration 
of the world’s regional and national economies. Finance is also often seen as 
one of the major driving forces behind the ‘globalisation’ phenomenon, if not 
the central one, along with other aspects, such as advances in information 
technology and many other kinds of engineering for instance. Foreigner direct 
investment (FDI) is also seen as a major catalyst of globalisation. According to 
Burke (1996) FDI is also seen as its primary one: Thus, the principal agent for 
such globalisation in the contemporary global political economy is FDI. 
Many academics, politicians and others appear to believe that while 
globalisation may not be entirely new, it is however achieving far higher levels 
of economic and societal interdependence and integration ‘globally’ than ever 
have been in recorded human history. According to this perspective, 
contemporary technology, labour markets and financial systems are better 
equipped and suited to a truly global economy than their historic counterparts. 
One particularly interesting view was found on the internet. Globalisation is 
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not just a recent phenomenon. Some analysts have argued that the world 
economy was just as global 100 years ago as it is today.  But today commerce 
and financial services are far more developed and deeply integrated than they 
were at that time. The most striking aspect of this has been the integration of 
financial markets made possible by modern electronic communication 
(International Monetary Fond, 2004). 
Globalisation: an unstoppable force for good? 
Those who make such statements as those above appear to believe 
strongly that globalisation is unstoppable. The reasoning behind this is hard to 
disregard. The military conflicts in the European continent, in the Pacific 
Oceania in the 1910s and 1940s, and the various periods of tension between 
France, Germany, Japan, the UK and the USA and the USSR, of the last 
century and more, are indicative of the potentially dangerous consequences of 
protectionism and isolationist measures that countries can choose to adopt. 
These conflicts brought about widespread deaths, and destruction of 
infrastructure and productive capacity. A high economic and human price can 
be paid for the luxury of a segregated world economy. Embracing the outside 
world through in free international trade and further economic integration can 
have a plethora of benefits, financial, political and social. It appears that this is 
one of the most important lessons that can be learnt from the last 60 to 100 
years. Economic integration can help to limit the possibility of conflicts over 
resources of any type arising between nations. But the benefits of openness are 
not only economic. Whatever its flaws, no one seriously doubts that Europe is 
better off with the European Union than without it (WTO, 2005). 
These claims that such openness of trading and continued integration is a 
force for good and that today’s apparently unprecedented proportions of world 
trade and integration have never before been experienced, and not only that, 
they are also responsible for peace and stability throughout the developed 
world, appear to be very plausible. To take a more reasoned view, if we 
compare the different economic prosperity of the Balkans to that of the EU in 
the 1990s, during civil war in Yugoslavia, it is easy to see why such beliefs 
have permeated so prolifically throughout the world, as war and instability, due 
to protectionist policies, do seem to be unpleasant experiences for all parties 
involved in these conflicts. No one can doubt that the economic integration 
brought about by the EU and the initial step taken towards European 
integration by the signing of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 
Treaty signed by the original European Common Market ‘six’ of France, 
Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, has helped to build 
growth and that it was central in bringing about today’s levels of economic 
prosperity and stability to the continent. 
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Worldwide and Regional Economic and Social Integration as Proof 
of Globalisation 
It is the very integration and regional convergence outlined previously 
and the interdependent character of globalisation that makes it so influential 
and which may therefore also make contemporary conventional perceptions 
very difficult, if wrong, to oppose and dispel. The world is seemingly shrinking 
as a result of globalisation. Compression of time and space in the last fifty 
years is often referred to, using terms such as the global village and the ever 
shrinking world. Clearly technical changes have made for easier and faster 
communication, travel and financial transactions. According to Hoogvelt 
(1997) compression of the world is the real experience of the way that 
interdependencies are being created in the economies of the world to such an 
extent that, today, the way we live our lives on this side of the globe has 
immediate consequences for people on the other side of the globe. 
Hoogvelt suggested that there is much more connectedness between the 
lives of people who will never meet each other, like people in East Asia who 
work in factories that make Nike trainers and the people in the affluent 
countries who wear them while jogging, although the power of the economies 
of the developed countries is massively greater than those of the rest. In a 
variety of ways, economic activities exert a powerful catalytic force, often 
called ‘globalisation’ in order to refer to Western culture impacting the rest of 
the earth in ways that lead to greater worldwide cultural homogeneity (Asgary 
and Walle, 2002). Examples of this type are in abundance, that 
interdependence, integration, internationalisation and all of those factors 
already mentioned, which amount to the term globalisation, are all very 
influential and their influence is then, it would seem, proof of the 
phenomenon’s (globalisation’s) existence. 
Global Trade 
Steingraber (1996) estimated that global trade had increased by 225% 
from what it was in 1981, now almost 25 years ago. Many academics would 
agree with this appraisal and argue that statistics such as this are undeniable 
factual evidence that the levels of global trade and integration being 
experienced today are unprecedented. However they might concede that while 
levels of ‘globalisation’ may be higher than ever, international trade is not itself 
a new phenomenon. Steingraber (1996) also believed that the what is 
commonly referred to as globalisation is an issue in itself, which was and is 
simply a more elaborate form of global or international trade and is therefore a 
crucial factor in the growth of the wider ‘globalisation’ phenomenon, which is 
convergence of culture and technology as opposed to simply more integration 
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forms of trade and economic interdependence. It is also seen as by him as 
having unstoppable momentum. If the views of Steingraber are it correct, 
‘globalisation’ is probably hard to ignore, but what exactly does it involve? De 
Wilde (1991) characterised globalisation as three worldwide economic and 
technological trends. These were, the cumulative effect of IT, worldwide media 
and the rise of integrated telecommunication and info-metric systems; the 
development of global capital markets with the ability to move resources in 
response to opportunity; and, the generation of export-orientated business 
strategies as the global market becomes accessible to entrepreneurs 
everywhere. 
In light of such facts, it appears that the ‘global shift’ towards an ever 
more integrated world and global economy is unprecedented, and that it is also 
arguably the most important trend underpinning any correct understanding of 
the world’s economy and the three main and the other trading blocs and the 
other countries that constitute it. 
Globalisation: a Real Phenomenon 
All the evidence thus far considered have gone some way to describing 
what globalisation is and shown evidence to support the view that it is a 
phenomenon consisting of unprecedented levels of worldwide integration and 
interdependence. It has not however explained why having a proper 
understanding of the subject matter is important when gauging whether today’s 
globalisation’s levels of growth and worldwide integration, are indeed really 
unprecedented. It is important to have an overview of the characteristics of 
world trade in order to properly understand a single nations place within the 
global economy (McAuley, 2001). In the opinion of McAuley and to a lesser 
extent Steingraber (1996), today’s world is characterised by global trade and 
large flows of labour and capital. However in addition to these factors 
globalisation does have certain negative characteristics such as shocks and 
adjustments according to Daniels and Radebaugh. The ‘Asian crisis’, between 
1998 and 2000, south East Asian ‘Tiger’ economies into disarray due to 
devaluation of so-called ‘hard ‘ and ‘soft’ regional currencies. ‘This resulted in 
a liquidity crisis in both hard currencies such as the U.S. dollar and soft 
currency the local currency of each country, such as the Thai baht (Daniels and 
Radebaugh 2000:132). For this and other financial and fiscal reasons due to 
investment trends linked to industry location and FDI, it is imperative to 
understand how the developed world’s economy works. 
Mc Auley (2001) referred to the above element of global economic 
instability in a very general manner. According to him ‘economies are like 
corks bobbing on the ocean’. To draw comparisons with the world’s financial 
markets and the ‘ocean’ has to merit that both tend to be unpredictable. The 
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above point suggests why full understanding of globalisation and world trade is 
important for understanding who maintains the most control over such matters 
as FDI allocation and attraction methods. According to Carr, Horitope and 
O’Connor (1980) the top 100 global retailers own a fifth or 20% of the world’s 
market share and continue to absorb many local competitors. From this 
statement it is clearly evident, why the developed world, where most of these 
retailers are based, is occupied primarily in responding and adjusting to these 
events. They account for 75% of all industrial research and development in 
economies of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OCED) and they dominate the international trade in technology payments 
(Chang, 2003). 
FDI and MNEs: Catalysts of Globalisation 
Since the 1970s FDI has been growing at a historically high rate. 
However most of this investment has been between the world’s wealthier, 
mainly Western countries, referred to next as the North. Thus the the bulk of 
the stock of FDI is among the world’s wealthier countries (the North) (Michie, 
and Smith 1999). In addition to this, however, a new trend has begun that is 
apparently characterised by increased degrees of investment from the richer 
North to the poorer South. The most astounding change is the rapid increase of 
flows to Asia, which increased its share of the world’s stock of inward FDI 
from 10% to 17% between 1980 and 1996. Note the spectacular rise in China 
and Hong Kong, which has increased its share of the world’s stock of inward 
FDI from 0.4% in 1980 to 5.5% in 1996’ (Michie and Smith, 1999). This is a 
very general overview of what has been happening. However the main points 
made do represent the basic theme in terms of FDI flows North to South. 
According to Michie and Smith, the amount of FDI going into the developing 
world is increasing rapidly with major shifts in the destinations for FDI. In the 
past there had been strong domination of FDI flows by the Triad/G3, meaning 
Japan, NAFTA and the EU and most of the investment made by companies 
was mainly ‘North-North’. Chang (2003) tended to agree quite strongly with 
the summary of the current situation given by Mitchie and Grevie. Chang 
asserted that since the early 1980s the amount of FDI has been expanding four 
times faster than international trade, and that from the start from the start of the 
1970’s, the total output of MNEs has surpassed the amount of international 
trade occurring worldwide. Other sources bring their own views on this subject 
into the discussion, those views being backed by research that strengthens 
Chang’s point of view that ‘FDI in developing countries has increased 
dramatically in recent years, for example, from $36.9 billion to $56.3 billion 
between 1991 and 1993; see Hutton 1995, suggesting that more and more 
countries are being drawn into the process of globalisation’ (Chang, 2003). 
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From Chang’s assertion above it is evident that globalisation is in fact 
spreading from the developed world countries to at least some degree and that 
the main catalyst for this spread of global trade is nowadays the FDI made by 
large Multinational and Transnationals evident from much of Chang’s research 
is the fact that while trade has been accelerating, FDI has matched this growth 
fourfold. Taken together all these apparently real and undeniable facts seem to 
paint a picture of an ever more integrated world economy, in which 
interdependencies, integration between the world’s economies and an ever 
advancing agenda of mutual co-operation and development between the ‘rich 
West’ is beginning to spill over into the poorer South and East. Other observers 
of the international business world reaffirm the main points made above. It is 
documented in various textbooks and in the business world itself that most 
multinationals nearly always operate in host countries through FDI (Daniels 
and Radebaugh, 2001). 
This phenomenon, which many have described as ‘globalisation’, is not 
an egalitarian process in all respects. Nevertheless its recent form can be only 
regarded as a stage in that process, and on the whole the process discussed in 
this section and the interpretations of so many observers and analysts, make it 
seem a force for a more peaceful and prosperous future for humankind. For 
example Mc Auley (2001) wrote that globalisation has now begun and that it is 
an unstoppable force. The challenge now was to make it work for as many 
people as possible. This sort of appraisal seems to be both optimistic and 
realistic in its conclusions about the current economic state of the world. 
Factors driving Globalization 
Scholte (2000) argued that globalisation is occurring at many levels and 
in many different ways. However it is the free flow and ease of movement of 
finance, especially of large national and ‘supranational’ currencies like the 
Pound, the U.S. dollar and the Euro, which act almost like lubricants, of the 
global economy by the ways in which they facilitate rapid and efficient 
international transactions. 
‘Global communications, global markets and global production have all 
promoted, and been facilitated by, a fourth area of global activity, namely, in 
relation to money. For one thing, the American dollar, the „Japanese” yen, the 
„German” mark and other major „national” currencies have undergone a 
significant degree of de-territorialisation. They circulate globally being used 
anywhere on earth at the same time and moving (electronically and via air 
transport) anywhere on earth in effectively no time (Scholte, 2000).  While 
Scholte argued that ‘money’ is the main force behind globalisation, Levitt 
(1983) saw technology as the main driver of it. Levitt uses the term creator of 
globalisation. Levitt is here referring to the growing use of I.T. across the 
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world and to the job creation accounted for by such companies and as 
Microsoft and HP which invest huge sums of monies and relocate ‘core’ 
activities to places like the Republic of Ireland in the EU, resulting in 
unprecedented growth (in this case) in the Irish Republic’s economy and 
increases in the standard of living. Whether the future may be less or more 
financially rewarding, time will tell. At the height of its 20-year economic 
boom occurring between 1982 and 2002 the Republic of Ireland, for example, 
was the recipient of large volumes of FDI, where non-labour-intensive 
activities were relocated mainly to the Dublin county area, and when some of 
core activities of the large MNCs like HP and Apple were relocated there. 
Apple’s and HP’s European Middle East and Africa headquarters are now both 
Dublin-based. It is probably also even more surprising that even Orange UK’s 
head quarters, a foreign country operation of Orange’s, is actually based in 
Dublin in the Republic of Ireland, as opposed to the country whose markets it 
is principally targeting. 
I.T. and the design and manufacture of software and hardware, like the 
types, which Apple, HP and Compaq provide, for example, are classed as being 
part of a global industry. To be part of a ‘global industry’, such as I.T and 
software design, a company must also be more dynamic competitive in order to 
succeed in a more integrated world economy, and thus help perpetuate a more 
competition-driven global industry. 
The increased threat from foreign competition seems to be driving 
companies to become globally competitive. This increase in competition 
appears to be a result of increased levels of connectedness due to technical 
progress and the so-far apparently continuing trends of deregulation and 
integration of world markets, outlined already in this chapter. 
Hamel and Prahalad (1989) believed that it was more than merely vision 
that caused many of the leading global companies of the previous two decades 
(the 1970s and the 1980s) to begin with ambitions that were out of proportion 
to their resources and capabilities. It was the prospect of increasing their 
market share by expanding to the international platform of competition. The 
benefits of competing internationally and succeeding seemingly created an 
obsession with winning at all levels and then sustained that obsession over 10 
to 20 years' of quests for ‘global leadership’ in the markets in which the 
companies were most strongly focused. Therefore it is the desire of a company 
to achieve ‘global competitiveness’ along with factors such as technology, 
innovation, quality, productivity and overall effectiveness, which has seemed 
to bring about actual global competitiveness of MNCs. 
Countries and companies that are competing in international markets and 
which are open to international competition, need to compete with ‘global 
strategies’, not just incorporating foreign trade but also incorporating foreign 
investment, into their strategic investments and activities. Therefore nations 
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with strong international economic presences, need to provide a competitive 
advantages for their home companies. To do this they need to form strong 
home bases for their companies to compete internationally from. Porter (1986), 
referred to this as a Global Platform. He felt that it was in the home nation of a 
company where its essential competitive advantages could be created and 
maintained, through the catalyst of attractive levels of lowered corporation tax 
and other similar financial incentives. Porter believed that a country in which a 
company was based would only be an advantageous platform for it to be based 
in, if it created the best climates for firms to achieve competitive advantage in 
the industry in which the companies in question primarily operated.  
The strategic implications for such companies as HP and Apple focused 
largely around the need to be very internationally adaptable and innovative. 
High levels of competition, even for the richest nation states and their ‘home-
team’ companies that are based in or close to their borders, are challenging the 
adaptability of these richer regions and countries. Much of the aforementioned 
competition being is due mainly to increases in the levels of integration of the 
world’s markets, as already outlined. Such increased competition is found 
mainly in the G3 trading blocs and their surrounding dependent regions. 
As the pattern of international competition shifts towards globalization, 
there are many implications for the strategy formulation of previously 
unchallenged and dominating MNCs. In a globalized industry, functions of 
finance, marketing, business and government relationships change, 
configurations of the global market in which a company/country may operate. 
All of the influences discussed above, have been attributed mainly to the 
effects that globalization has on national economies and namely their attitudes 
and policies regarding foreign investment, and to what their home companies 
need to do to respond to this competition. From the evidence presented by 
various researchers and commentators, globalization does present itself as an 
undeniable and un-ignorable force in the inter-nationlised economy. As 
markets deregulate, and regions, nations and trading blocs and economies 
continue to integrate, the occurrence of such convergence, is on course to 
continue. The only question that can be asked is, if the proportions of 
convergence now being witnessed are in fact unprecedented and if they have 
never been experienced before in history, how can it be directed in a way that 
works best for largest numbers of the world’s population. 
Globalisation and Convergence II: The Arguments Against 
The word globalisation is used widely by the mass media, and it is not 
uncommon to hear observers of many kinds speaking of unprecedented degrees 
of economic and cultural integration being experienced in recent times. This is 
an assertion of a now popular perspective, which sees barriers to trade and the 
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movement of populations as increasingly belonging to the past. ‘Globalisation 
has become a fashionable concept in the social sciences, a core dictum in the 
prescriptions of management guru’s, and a catch phrase for journalists and 
politicians of every stripe’ (Hirst and Thompson, 1999: 1). 
At the core of this theory is the view that globalisation is a process 
characterised by the current rapid growth in world trade, deregulation of 
markets and the spread of ever-closer ties between countries and economic 
regions such as trading blocs and customs unions. It claims that the world is 
dominated by an emerging or recently emerged and truly global economy, one 
where national strategies for economic growth and management and have been 
marginalized in terms of their relevance to this new world economy. Various 
observers believe, as well as IT technology, and culture, that for many 
globalisation has become the latest in long line of the vague ‘buzz’ words, 
which have been concurrently used to describe that explain the complicated 
modern international economy. From the statements above, the term 
globalisation seeks to describe a particular vision or interpretation of the 
world’s current trend of development, one in which all the societies, cultures, 
polities and economies have come closer together, in some senses (Keilety and 
Marfleet, 1998). 
Globalisation, as outlined in the above definitions, is apparently a factor 
affecting all our lives and, it is claimed, it is occurring at levels unprecedented 
and never before experienced in by the regional economies, trading blocs and 
nation states of the world. While the above definition of globalisation is popu-
lar and generally accepted by many political observers, politicians, media orga-
nizations, and academics, it is also and it is also a ‘distorted’ image of some 
very real facts. Thus, if the theorists of globalisation mean that we have an 
economy in which each part of the world is linked by markets sharing close to 
real-time information, then that began not in the 1970s but in the 1870s’ (Hirst 
and Thompson, 1999). Here Hirst and Thomson (1999) were arguing that while 
it was clear that globalisation of a kind or has been happening, it also happened 
long before the term ‘globalisation was introduced. The basis of their argument 
in this respect that between 1870 and 1913 global markets were linked much 
more closely through the Gold Standard’ system. In this system nation states 
currency were pegged to gold values, whereby a certain amount of currency 
was equal to a certain amount of gold. 
The Gold Standard from 1870 to 1913 
According to Eichengreen, the gold standards appeal can be traced back 
to the once held belief, that it provides price and exchange rate stability than 
any other system. From the 1870 to1913 in the Gold Standard era, the use of 
gold was indeed seen as a more reliable and transparent method of currency 
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and exchange rate management than the current method of floating currency on 
the stock markets. There, in lay its appeal, simplicity and stability. Use of the 
Gold Standard was a particularly effective method for ensuring that a nation’s 
currency was credible in international markets. At the time when membership 
of the British Empire was seen as an important factor when ensuring the 
stability and credibility of a country’s currency, it seems that this was not as 
vital to achieving market credibility as some observers at the time believed. As 
it was not a necessity to have membership of the British empire, and neither 
was it a preferential attribute or precondition in order for a country to gain 
access to London’s capital market before 1914, as adherence to the Gold 
Standard was seemingly enough in itself to enhance the creditability of a 
nations currency in the world markets of the period (Obstfeld and Taylor 
2003). 
The facts above are in agreement with other historians’ views, that there 
was a very high decree of economic integration and globalisation before the 
First World War (Obstfeld and Taylor 2003). These, and, Hirst and Thompson, 
and others, have argued that in comparison with today’s level of integration of 
global markets and economies, the 1870 to 1914 era was more integrated and 
thus the world’s economy, in reality was more ‘global’ then, compared to 
today’s level of ‘globalisation’. 
The ‘Gold Standard’ from 1914 to 1924 and from 1925 to 1931 
Apparently the form that the Gold Standard adopted form 1925 to 1931 
was significantly less effective in assuring market credibility of its users than 
its pre-war predecessor was. Evidently it can be gathered by looking back, that 
the type of global convergence in the bond market prior to 1914, as caused by 
the Gold Standard, came to be replaced by quite different and less integrative 
forces afterwards (Obstfeld and Taylor, 2003). Hirst and Thompson (1999) 
seemingly concur with this view that the Gold Standard really was not 
reintroduced successfully after the First World War (1918). They argued that, it 
is often thought that there have been just two regimes in the twentieth century, 
the Gold Standard and the Bretton Woods system, the former breaking down in 
the inter war period and the latter in the post-1973 period’ (Hirst and 
Thompson, 1999: 33). 
The Second World War, Europe and the Marshall Plan 
‘World War Two left in its wake economic as well as human destruction 
throughout Europe. European political leaders realised that they needed to 
forge greater cooperation’ (Daniels and Radebaugh 2001: 235). 
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In the aftermath of the Second World War the main Continental 
European economic and military powers and their neighbouring states were 
largely left in tatters. Leaders of France, Germany, Italy and the three Benelux 
countries (Belgium, Netherlands and Luxemburg) all decided that unpredicted 
volumes of integration and cooperation between these Six were needed. To 
sustain the initial step towards economic restructuring the USA’s Congress 
passed a bill allowing for a $13 billion aid package called the Marshall Plan, to 
be given to the UK and to the European countries worst affected by the Second 
World War. Daniels and Radebaugh (2000) captured the theme of the Marshall 
Plan initiative with their summary of the way in which it was implemented. 
The Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was created. It 
was responsible for overseeing the implementation of the Marshal Plan. The 
OEEC carried out the Marshall and also sought to improve currency stability, 
combine Europe’s economic strengths, and provide the necessary economic 
growth. The Marshall Plan in 1947 (in Europe) and the similar Dodge Plan (in 
Japan) were both pivotal to the re-establishment of the world trading to 
volumes comparable to pre-1914 levels. These plans gave the USA complete 
fiscal control and liability for Japan’s currency as well as for West Germany’s 
economy. 
Japan: The Second World War, the Dodge Plan and the Outbreak 
of the Cold War 
According to Kosai it was due to the Cold War in the few years after the 
Second World War ended, that the Dodge Stabilization Policy (known as the 
Dodge plan) was implemented in 1949, after Japanese manufacturing and 
mining had nearly come to a complete standstill. The USA’s National Security 
Council so-called 13/2 resolution of 1950 was concerned with the security and 
economic recovery of Japan. The USA wanted Japan to become a bulwark 
against communism in the South Pacific. This resolution formalised the major 
shift in America’s basic policy towards Japan, removing many restrictions that 
had been imposed and decreeing that Japanese economic recovery would be 
expedited (Nakamura 1981). Soon after this in 1949, Joseph Dodge introduced 
the Dodge Plan. It was a deflationary measure, which cut aid to Japan and 
encouraged international competition and recovery of Japan’s economy, which 
would hopefully come about as a result of the Japanese’s own efforts. 
Not all of the consequences of the Dodge Plan were positive. Damage 
done to the Japanese economy by the Dodge Plan was severe as regards mining 
and manufacturing productivity, due mainly to such outside influences as the 
devaluation of Great Britain’s pound. All these nation and economy building 
activities had to be undertaken in the view of the USA, to avoid repetition of 
the divergent protectionist nightmare of the 1930s. Thus the reasoning behind 
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such initiatives as the Dodge and Marshall Plans was to return as much as was 
possible to the levels of world trade and economic integration enjoyed in the 
pre-1914 period of the Gold Standard. These initiatives would eventually lead 
to the establishment of the quasi-dollar/gold standard system, which came to be 
known as under the Bretton Wood’s agreement of July 1944. 
Bretton Woods: the Quasi-Gold/Dollar Standard of the 1960s-1970s. 
By the late-1960’s the Bretton Woods-managed world order which had 
been established under US informal imperial rule began to be challenged both 
by some western European states, and by the international capital markets. 
Although most Western countries agreed to the adoption of the Bretton Woods 
system, by the 1960s most European countries of economic and political 
importance began to challenge, what had now moving towards de facto US 
imperial rule.  World capital markets also began to challenge the domination of 
the USA by making speculations against the dollar, the currency, which had 
been the equivalent to what Gold Standard was from 1870 to 1913. Both 
challenges were apparently examples of how the Bretton Woods, was damaged 
by its own success. It had reached its aim of re-establishing worldwide 
economic integration; however a spill over effect of this was the substantial 
growth of US capital internationally. Eventually this success caused its 
eventual collapse. Under the Bretton Woods system, as Hoogvelt (1997). the 
US had succeeded in re-establishing the unity of the world market and this had 
encouraged a phenomenal transitional expansion of US capital.  Hoogvelt 
argued that the subsequent Bretton Woods system had primarily been an 
initiative to rebuild the world’s economy and to re-establish the degrees of 
global economic integration, which existed before 1914, by reunifying the 
world’s economies into one ‘world market’.  
This post-1945 re-unification of the world’s national economies seems to 
have been a type of ‘neo-Gold Standard’, which unfortunately lacked stability 
of the original Gold Standard, but which was the best that could seemingly be 
managed in the circumstances. ‘Under the Bretton Woods system, control of 
the money supply in Japan was completely subordinate to the goal of 
maintaining a fixed nominal exchange rate of Yen 360=$1’ (Flath 2000: 129). 
If the USA decided to tighten its monetary policy, Japan was then forced to 
mirror this action by adopting a similar in relation to its monetary policy. This 
also was the case for many other national currencies under the Bretton Woods 
scheme. However as has been shown, it would not last forever. 
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The Collapse of Bretton Woods 
Under the Bretton Woods arrangements the US dollar became a global 
currency, thus by the early 1970s the value of dollars circulating outside the 
USA exceeded the value of gold stocks held by the American central bank. In 
these circumstances the Nixon Administration halted dollar-gold convertibility 
in 1971 (Scholte, 2000). Soon after the Bretton Woods scheme collapsed, most 
of the world’s major national economies floated their currencies on the foreign 
exchange market. For example the Japanese yen, a currency that some would 
argue the most tightly linked of all to the dollar previously, was floated on the 
international/foreign exchange market soon after the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system in 1971.When the Yen was floated on the international stock 
exchanges in 1973, this changed the balance of payments role for ever. Then in 
1973 the yen was put on a floating exchange basis. That was the end of the 
balance of payments’ role as a check on expansion. This had marked the end of 
the Gold Standard’s era in 1973 of currency supremacy. 
Multinational and Transnational Companies: Truly Global? 
MNEs global activities are seen to be initially beneficial to the host 
country but eventually over time the investments become more favourable to 
the home government. As initially beneficial as many of the immediate affects 
of MNCs investing in other countries are, it is often short-lived. In fact many 
MNCs and TNCs, are rarely based outside the home nation i.e. the country of 
the companies’ origins. Claims about large MNCs that move freely and without 
prejudice in today’s, ‘global’ world are at best slight exaggerations and at worst 
major distortions of the facts. Many observers indeed believe that we now live 
in truly global market, where capital is moved easily worldwide. This as with 
many of the core beliefs of globalization theorists, is not a complete untruth but 
a distortion and exaggeration. 
Thus, claims about the footloose nature of TNCs are also often 
exaggerated. There are many industries where investments involve a large 
amount of sunk costs  that restrict the mobility of the firms involved (Chang 
2003). It seems that many TNCs are limited in the scope of their transnational 
operations in the true sense of the word, whereby most of the core activities 
stay in the home country or are moved to neighbouring countries and other 
developed countries where the company has large economic interests to 
consider, like the need to be in close proximity to major markets. One specific 
form of this behaviour is when USA-based companies are found to be basing 
their headquarters in Canada to cut costs, and because the currency speculation 
opportunities from the strength of the US$ against the Canadian$ for example. 
It thus follows, in addition, at most TNCs, the top decision makers are home 
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country nationals. Hirst and Thompson also asserted their position on this 
subject, stating that when core activities are relocated, they are more often than 
not moved to other developed ‘Western’ countries in, Europe, North America, 
or Japan primarily. Thus many of the large MNCs are not international in the 
true sense at all, choosing to locate core business activities in their home 
country or neighbouring ones, especially in countries with low psychic 
distance. So, and as the reporter of a survey by the Economist puts it, ‘generally 
speaking, what [TNCS] have done is to extend their bases into neighbouring 
countries’ (The Economist, 27 March, 1993, pp.15-6). 
FDI the Triad/Group of 3 and Group of 8: The True Nature of the 
Global Economy 
Foreign Direct Investment appears to be generally regarded, at least by 
most mass media commentators, as a positive thing for a country to receive in 
terms of economic growth and job creation. Spillovers of technical know-how 
are seen as some of the many short-term and positive effects that FDI bring to 
poorer countries and regions. So it…‘it is often assumed that FDI brings 
benefits to host country’s through productivity spillovers from MNEs 
(Rodriquez-Clare, 1996). However many countries, which are recipient of FDI, 
do not appear to benefit anything like as much as these point suggest. Often the 
effects of FDI are very much short-term positive ones, and are very often much 
smaller than the equivalent volume and quality of spillovers found in the 
industrial and more developed countries of the world, those of the Group of 
Eight (G8) and especially the Triad or the Group of Three (G3). 
This said, the effects of spillovers can be and often are much more 
dramatic in the short term for Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) and Less 
Developed Countries (LDCs). Nevertheless most FDI is between the industrial 
and developed nations. Generally speaking, the bulk of the investment flows 
have been ‘North-North’, a shorthand expression for movements from one 
industrialised country to another’ (Robock and Simmons 1989). Since FDI 
between developed countries currently accounts for 75% of total FDI, while 
only 25% is accounted for by less developed countries this? According to 
Robock and Simmons, this is known as the ‘North-South’ flow. The effects of 
MNEs in the developed countries are likely to be relatively smaller than those 
in those NICs,  such as those of South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Singapore 
contributed 25% to world GDP in the early 1990’s as compared to 4% in the 
1960s’ (Parker 1998: 14). 
The effect that a MNE can have on the latter two country types 
mentioned above is probably in most cases more substantial, than say for 
instance the effect that a large degree of FDI would have on a country like 
Canada. Until fairly recently Canada had around half of its capital employed 
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and controlled by foreign companies, especially so in the oil and gas industry, 
‘by 1984, foreigners controlled only 45% of the capital employed in the oil and 
gas industry, down from 75% in the mid 70’s’ (Robock and Simmons 1989: 
29). Canada was also until recently the most heavily invested in country in 
terms of financial direct investment, this caused negative side-effects like the 
one illustrated above, this scenario is especially true if a MNE’s on local 
operations employ the best local resources natural or otherwise. 
Thus, in many cases FDI can lead to frustration of development for a 
host economy, stunting entrepreneurial growth and curtailing innovation and 
eroding a country’s competitive potential. The following statement by the 
OECD seems to suggest that ‘MNEs have become an integral part of the 
international economy, bringing investment and technology as well as tax 
revenues to their host countries. On the other hand the rise of this corporate 
activity has resulted in public concern at the effect of businesses on the people 
and the environment of the countries where they operate. From the various 
sources drawn from, an especially the above statement, it seems evident that 
most of FDI by MNCS and TNCs in to LDCs is in mainly labour-intensive 
areas of production, and where costs can be lowered through investment abroad 
and outsourcing. Most of the core activities of MNCs tend to be based in the 
home countries as opposed to being based in LDCs and NICs. Often FDI in the 
latter will have negative long-term effects on them.  
Conclusions 
From analyzing the various information gathered and synthesized it is 
apparent that the current volumes of integration being experienced in world 
markets and national economies is neither unprecedented, and nor is it 
completely global. The reality of the situation that presents itself, in light of 
these facts is that countries of the richer more developed West, namely the 
Triad, both receive and invest the substantial majority of all the FDI. They are 
also apparently the net beneficiaries in many instances of FDI, reaping the 
large financial rewards they do through economies of scale and cheap labour 
opportunities, which are presented in the forms of tax holidays world wide, that 
many developing national economies offer them. The following quotation 
below clearly and concisely illustrates exactly the point made above,  the bulk 
of FDI occurs among the developed countries only a handful of developing 
countries take part in the trans-national investment story (Dicken 1998). It does 
then appear that, in the case of investment the flows have been particularly 
intense between North America and Western Europe. 
Claims made in the above quotation, by Sir Leon Brittan, were referred 
to by Chang (2003) in his book ‘Globalisation of the European Integration’, in 
it the Vice President of the European Commission asserted that the ratio of FDI 
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and trade, is ‘evening’ itself out, with his reference to increased capital flows to 
Asia don’t ‘stand-up’ to closer investigations the assertion by former vice 
president of the European Commission, that ‘[o]ver half of the world FDI now 
goes to developing countries’ (Brittan 1995: 3). It thus appears that while 
globalisation as it is referred to be a dynamic and influential force it is also not 
an unprecedented worldwide phenomenon that cannot be explained or 
contrasted with any degree of comparability to anything that has preceded it or 
is likely to follow it. Therefore as above discussion suggests the evidence 
purporting that this is a unique level of global integration and economic 
interdependencies is on the whole rejected. The paradox confining many 
analysts of globalisation is that while the changes upon us seem revolutionary, 
much of the data suggest that what we are experiencing is, in fact, not 
unprecedented. 
As a final point, maybe Globalisation is just merely one of the many 
cycles of convergence and divergence that have occurred throughout history. It 
appears that many countries converge when there are a few dominant empires 
or hegemonies, and then diverge when there is not just one or a few dominant 
powers in the world. 
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